IN NEWFOUNDLAND, the historical experience of capital accumulation did not take place predominantly within the context of industrial capitalist development. The labour of a working class, until the mid-twentiedi century, remained confined to services ancillary to the fishery in a few urban areas, the railway, some mining, and the early pulpand paper industry. Most Newfoundlanders depended on the fisheries for their livelihoods, yet the struggle between classes in Newfoundland's fishing commumties has received, until recently, only scant attention, the most recent statement about social relations in the Newfoundland fishery being that of Gerald Sider. Sider felt truck to be the great exploitative evil in Newfoundland's history -the social and economic form of merchant capital's hegemony over Newfoundland society. Merchants exploited the fishery by impoverishing fishing families through the use of baiter to buy salt cod for resale. Families were never given cash, but held accounts in which supplies were balanced against catches; some families' successes balanced against others' losses so that most families remained in constant debt to merchants. Some merchants also used tal qual, paying an average price for all cures provided by fisher families, but setting those prices themselves.
same time (me 1870s), the Newfoundland fish merchants began to consolidate their enterprises in St. John's. As part of this structural shift, the Slades sold their Newfoundland operations, including Battle Harbour, to Baine, Johnston & Co. of St. John's. Only fragmentary evidence remains of Battle Harbour District fishing families' experiences with truck. In 1909 a visitor at Battle Harbour reported that residents remembered the Slades as a firm which used very exacting truck charges, inflating the prices of provisions obtained on credit by as much as 100 per cent above cash prices for goods. This same observer asserted that Baine, Johnston was less exploitative, acting as a paternalistic "guide, philosopher and friend of the entire community." This view must be tempered by JP. Alley's earlier view that Baine, Johnston & Co. kept "nearly all of is three hundred inhabitants in debt to it In 1917, acting on complaints about the truck system by the International Grenfell Association, the Newfoundland government appointed a royal commission to investigate the IGA co-operative movement Baine, Johnston's agent at Battle Harbour, John Croucher, defended the truck system before the commission. In the process, he gave some idea of how this system worked. Croucher stated that Baine, Johnston took on all the risk of the fishing season by giving fishermen credit before the firm knew what international fish prices would be at the end of the season. If prices proved low, Baine, Johnston stood to lose on its investment, through credit in fishermen's voyages. Croucher believed that this risk obliged Battle Harbour fishermen to trade all of their fish to Baine, Johnston at the season's end. At the same time as he defended the merchants' side of truck, Croucher stated that any competition that worked against the mutual obligations of truck, any leakage in the system whereby fishermen could deal outside of truck with other merchants, would "unfairly" destabilize the supply merchants' economic base.
Aggregate census data for 193S suggests that the District of Battle Harbour relied heavily on merchant provisioning for most of its subsistence goods. The entire region produced only 8 bushels of potatoes and 1,650 lbs. of cabbage to help feed 802 people. Some livestock, goats, and hens were kept by residents and these produced a little milk, eggs, and perhaps, meat Every other dietary staple in addition to clothes and the other necessities of life had to be purchased from merchants. St John's merchants dominated die economy of Newfoundland. Their continued use of tal quaL along wim population expansion and capital impoverishment due to track, aD contributed to the declining quality of the Newfoundland fish product at die same time world fish prices were falling and supplies of better-quality Icelandic fish were increasing after 1919. Through die 1930s, little was done to change the situation. Merchants and governments preferred to follow economic diversification policies through agriculture, railways, rural inland settlement, and domestic manufacturing, and use public works programs to absorb die unemployed, while ignoring Newfoundland's economic base in die salt fishery. The results were, at various times, a weakening of die merchant firms in die fisheries; impoverishment of the Labrador fishery; severe decline in die Bank fishery, deterioration in cure in all fisheries; impoverishment of large sectors of die population as a result of die truck system and low prices offered to fishermen for tiieir fish; further lack of cooperative marketing by merchants; and a decline in suitable local shipping to access markets.
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This economic crisis, particularly on Newfoundland's northeast coast, moved many fish merchants to withdraw capital from die fishery, particularly widi respect to winter relief and die extension of credit to diose repeatedly unable to clear most of dieir debts. By die first decades of die 20th century, a process of social differentiation was well underway among fishing families; even outside die Conception Bay area, die "traditional'' household-based fishing villages were nowhere so homogeneous in their structure as Sider suggests. As they tightened credit, merchants increasingly dealt only with fishing families owning capital equipment -like cod traps or motor boats -that could be used as collateral. Families with little or no equipment faced two prospects: pooling resources to buy equipment, or becoming a labour reserve employed by diose with equipment In either case fishing communities produced a number of "trap skippers,'' linked to their fellow fishermen by family and community ties, but becoming increasingly responsible for die management of production and marketing. These skippers were something more analogous to skilled master craftsmen in relation to journeymen than they were to merchants. Many, in their reaction to mercantile exploitation, provided die Fishermen's Protective Union with its organizational base both on die northeast coast and on die Labrador coast. As the work of Barbara Neis suggests, the early 1900s saw increased differentiation among fishing families arise from increased differences in families' ownership of fishing equipment. While only five fishing families registered no income in 1934-35,24 indicated (hat they owned no equipment. The 1935 census lists the heads of all these famines as independent fishermen who did not work for wages. In the Battle Harbour District, then, fishing families with little or no equipment must have engaged in some sort of shares arrangement, bearing part of the fishing voyage's expenses and gaining a property right in the catch, with those who did have equipment Thirty-four families owned small amounts of equipment, valued at less than $500. Twenty-three families owned between $500-1,000 worth of equipment while twenty-one owned between $1,000-1,500. These numbers drop sharply to only six families owning between $1,500-2,000; and five each owning $2,000-2,500,and $2,500-3,000. Only one fishing family possessed $3,000 worth of equipment -that of Gus Bradley at Indian Cove. Bradley was fortunate enough to own, among other equipment two motor boats, two cod traps, and ten salmon nets.
Unwilling to risk their capital by extending credit to all fishing families, merchants in the northeast coast and Labrador fisheries by the 1930s gave credit only to those with motor boats and cod traps. Yet such equipment was labour-intensive in operation. We are surprised to leara that he [Pye] should play a double part. We thought he would at lean be loyal to the firm. All you can do is watch the dealers that sold salmon to Allen, and if they do not square up with you in the Fall, tell them we will not stand for it another year. You will have to be tactful [emphasis mine] in bow you handle them. We presume if we do not supply them, some one else will, we mean for the codfish ery.
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When Loveridge questioned Pye about his loyalty to the firm, Pye replied that he gave Baine, Johnston half of his catch, the other to Allen's because of their better prices, "and said if we got half we ought to be satisfied.'' As for Bradley, he continued to deal where, and as, he pleased. As Loveridge told head office in St John's, as business declined on the coast the Battle Harbour store depended on the business of "independent*' men like Bradley. By 1938, Bradley's efforts proved so successful that he began to retail small items at Indian Cove to his neighbours.
Gus Bradley and James Pye, mavericks within the larger group of Baine, Johnston's fishermen-dealers, did not enjoy exceptionally high incomes. Bradley earned a respectable $600 while Pye registered no income in 1934-35. What separated these two fishermen from other family heads was the amount of equipment they owned. In the District, 46 families owned between them 67 cod traps, 65 families owned 89 motor boats, and 73 families owned 410 salmon nets. Bradley's two motor boats and two cod traps meant that he was somewhat better off than even those other families owning motor boats and cod traps. But Bradley's great advantage lay in the ten salmon nets he owned. The average number of these held by fishing families was only between five and six. Despite his lack of income, James Pye owned two each of motor boats and cod traps, but owned seven salmon nets. Differences in equipment ownership appear to be the only significant factor in allowing Bradley and Pye, die latter unsuccessfully, to challenge Baine, Johnston's claim to their produce. Neither Indian Cove (Bradley's home community) nor Cape Charles (Pye's home community) were far removed from the Company's headquarters at Battle Harbour proper [see Figure 3 ]. Bradley's and Pye's attempts to deal with firms other than Baine, Johnston were not facilitated by their being able to use distance as a shelter from the firm's watchful eye.
Bradley and Pye were distinct in the means which they used to catch more salmon than most At a time when Labrador cod fetched low prices in international markets, Baine, Johnston turned increasingly to the salmon fishery for compensation. While Pye succumbed to Baine, Johnston's pressure, Bradley did not Little direct evidence exists to suggest that Bradley's equipment, by providing livelihoods to those of his neighbours with less, gave him the influence with odier families that the firm so worried about But there are factors that make this a reasonable inference: Bradley could not operate all of his equipment on his own; Baine, Johnston clearly saw him as being much more independent than his fellow fishermen; and the Company acknowledged explicidy that Bradley was an important community leader. Bradley closely resembles those "trap skippers" Neis suggests were emerging in the northeast coast and Labrador fisheries in dûs period, using bom their community positions and new importance in production and marketing to launch a direct challenge to die hegemony of merchant capital over their lives.
To prevent other fishermen from following Bradley's course, warnings to Loveridge by Baine, Johnston not to give credit to those dealing with odier firms were accompanied by die caution "be tactful. ' This is important Even dealers like Thorns who remained subordinated to Baine, Johnston, actively negotiated the terms of that subordination. The year before, in 1933, the firm reprimanded Loveridge for insulting James Pye in a dispute over the latter's dealings with Allen's. Pye wanted, and received, an apology from Loveridge for calling him a "cur" in front of other men on the wharf at Battle Harbour. 29 Head Office was losing its patience with Loveridge. When it earlier had told him to trim expenses, instead of cutting his own, Loveridge cut perks given to fishermen when they came to the store. Anonymous letters arrived in St. John's complaining of Loveridge*s stinginess and he was reprimanded by the firm:
Pcftiapi in your eagerness to make the business a success yon have been rather 'nippy,' M we h»ve been told so. Thii does not pay, especially in a Labrador business, and when we tell yon to économise we do not mean you to cot an old custom. What we mean is, when the dealers come from far away places yon should give them a cup of tea, or what the fishermen call a 'mag-op,' rather than allow them to go away hungry. It may cost the firm perhaps five dollars or a little more to do so. but it is money weU spent and we do not want yon to stop this practice.
Baine, Johnston's director, T. Collingwood, also instructed Loveridge to stop "charging the fishermen 40 cents for the use of the puncheons.... I do not think it advisable to do this because it seems sort of nippy, and while the charge is small it leaves room for people to talk, and may do more harm than good. After more anonymous complaints through 1934-35, Baine, Johnston fired Loveridge to keep up some appearance of being a firm interested in accommodating the needs of Battle Harbour's residents. Baine, Johnston would rather dismiss its agent than further jeopardize relationships with its fish-suppliers, which already were strained by credit restrictions.
The firing of Loveridge is a strong statement about the role some fishermen played in shaping their own environment Because they controlled production, and because they enjoyed the intimate familiarity of families linked together in the structure of village communities, these fishermen had power. Its exertion was motivated by the family's well-being, its very subsistence, for, as Loveridge .". the following it a copy of the telegram received by oi last night from oar Battle Harbour agent: "Several family men facing starvation, rumour around will take good* informed Government today," signed 'Hoffe. ' We may lay mat we made no provision last year f or winter relief, but have ample stocks of provisions on hand to relieve aD deserving cases.
Hoffe is our winter agent, and has only one or two assistants, so that in the event of an attempt being made to take the goods forcibly, we could not protect them.
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The grand total of government relief allowed for die next year was $68.00 which, combined with a poor seal harvest, led S. Loveridge to comment "Many very deserving cases in sick and aged were left to mercy of poor friends and relatives, how these existed all through die long season is a mystery." feared that merchants would be too liberal in opening the public purse. But in the Baine, Johnston case, a new form of government chicanery occurred to Colonial Secretary Barnes, in light of the state's inability to use force to ensure minimum public relief expenditure: the Newfoundland government would arrange with Baine, Johnston to distribute relief without any participation by the Relief Officer.
The people when they are in need will approach... Chaiiei Hoffe, who will nae his discretion and give the people applying inch goods only as be thinks they actoally need on the undemanding that if they have no cash then, they will pay for the same from the process of the seals or fiir that they may catch daring the Winter Season.
That is, the goods given out will not be understood to be Government goods for the relief by those receiving the same, but win be taken as advances by your firm to men who will pay for the same in due coarse.
The government assured Baine, Johnston that any accounts not balanced would be paid for by the public account.
Baine, Johnston accepted this arrangement because, in the face of continuing defections by its best fishermen, it allowed the company to appear as if it was honouring old commitments to its dealers by nothing more than good will, when what appeared to be winter credit was guaranteed payment by the Newfoundland government. The Company realized that Hoffe would become die focal point for families' discontent about its strict credit policies, "... but it cannot be helped. The [government] realize that relief will be necessary, and all they ask us to do is to be firm, and after investigating to relieve those in need, and to get returns if it is possible. They have no intention of making us scapegoat Unfortunately for Hoffe, Battle Harbour families expressed much discontent about the new arrangements, and he feared that "much abuse will be hailed against us. ments. By 1933 the government appointed its own official, Neil, to begin taking over relief responsibilities, and Rev. Noel took charge of certifying relief cases so that government would pay Baine, Johnston. Through 1934 Neil administered relief and, in 1935, the Commission Government appointed a Ranger, Glendinning, to administer relief, although he would relieve only a small number of the most destitute. No evidence remains to suggest how those families Glendinning would not relieve survived. They probably continued to eke out a living from the fishery as best they could, perhaps even moving off the coast in search of work.
While no other threats of violence appear to have been made, households that either did not receive, or did not ask for relief refused to acquiesce in Baine, Johnston's continued restriction of credit Local dealers who did not like the Company's low prices offered for fish, or the lack of credit, in Loveridge's words "put the pistol to our heads (so to speak) for to barter some of the remains of fish that were on their hands or otherwise they would barter at Morgans. These fishermen sold salmon to anyone who might pay in cash. Loveridge's successor S.D. Grant charged that these families behaved as they did "to protect themselves for the winter and want us or somebody to feed them this fall. It is coming to a point where the supply system must end or find some means of protection against such treatment-'' 
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It is important to see that family well-being was the fundamental basis of fishermen's conflicts with the state and Baine, Johnston concerning winter relief at Battle Harbour in the 1930s. When merchant capital looked to the state for relief provisions, it did so in the first instance because Baine, Johnston restricted winter credit due to the "leakage" caused by some fishermen trading with the competitors of their old suppliers. This "leakage" represented fishermen exercising their power over the control of the supply of fish to sanction a firm which restricted credit Fishermen who could not elsewhere find credit, especially for the winter, demanded, with threats of violence, that Baine, Johnston fulfill its customary role in helping their famines survive a winter. These demands forced the company to turn to the state. The Newfoundland government had to concede relief because it had to acknowledge that in outport Newfoundland, the state had little actual means of enforcing a rule of law over custom. Government relief at Battle Harbour represented a compromise between the state and merchant capital to protect the latter's interests. But this compromise was essentially a concession to fishermen's claims. Fishermen's "traditions" included the ability to challenge and negotiate the terms of their exploitation by Baine, Johnston. Battle Harbour fishermen, whether they broke away from Baine, Johnston and dealt with other firms, or openly threatened the firm's Battle Harbour premises when Baine, Johnston tightened winter credit, showed a tremendous capacity to challenge the hegemony of merchant capital over both society and the state.
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